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Taking on TRAP Laws: Protecting Abortion 
Rights through Property Rights 
Hope Silberstein† 
ABSTRACT 
In deciding the constitutionality of abortion regulations, courts often apply an “un-
due burden” standard in order to determine whether such regulations impermis-
sibly hinder the ability of women to exercise their right to obtain abortion care. 
That standard focuses on patients rather than abortion clinics, despite the fact that 
a significant number of abortion regulations target clinic operations in order to 
make abortion more difficult to provide. Such regulations also make it difficult to 
operate and work at such clinics, given the frequent disruptions such laws cause. 
Rather than depending on the somewhat unclear legal foundation of undue bur-
den, this Comment proposes a strategy that clinic owners and other advocates for 
abortion rights could use to invalidate the targeted regulation of abortion providers 
(TRAP laws). Abortion clinic owners could argue that regulation of their clinics—
which makes them much more expensive to operate—constitutes a regulatory tak-
ing under the Takings Clause of the Fifth Amendment. This Comment analyzes 
the feasibility of applying takings law to typical state TRAP laws using both fed-
eral doctrine (particularly the Penn Central factors) and state-level takings stat-
utes. Although this strategy remains untested, abortion clinic owners could fare 
well using the Takings Clause as a means to stay open, protect their employees, 
and keep treating patients. 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Regulations of abortion providers and their facilities create uncer-
tainty and confusion for those who work at these clinics. Rather than 
treat healthcare providers similarly across the board, state legislatures 
have enacted regulations that apply specifically to abortion clinics. 
These regulations are known by their opponents as TRAP laws—the 
targeted regulation of abortion providers. One result of these regula-
tions is that owning and operating an abortion clinic has become inor-
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dinately more difficult, more so than for owners of other types of prac-
tices in other fields of medicine. Running abortion clinics is an ex-
tremely unsteady enterprise with constant legal challenges that make 
it difficult for clinic owners and employees to organize business affairs 
and activities or even maintain steady employment, especially in plan-
ning for the future. 
Laws that intend to make abortion more difficult to obtain have 
shifted their focus in recent years from the patient to the clinic. Starting 
in the 1970s, anti-abortion organizations and attorneys began to lobby 
for state regulations that would gradually strip away physicians’ 
ability to provide the procedure. Much of the legislation makes 
it more expensive for clinics to operate, and the strategy has 
proved effective. Since 2011 at least 162 abortion providers have 
closed or stopped performing abortions, and [only] 21 clinics 
have opened.1 
This kind of government action puts at risk the livelihood of these busi-
ness owners and all those who work at abortion clinics, a reality made 
even starker by the fact that other healthcare providers are not subject 
to the same kinds of regulations. Although the intended result of these 
laws is usually to decrease abortion access and therefore the number of 
abortions, the fact that legislatures have gone after the providers (as 
opposed to patients) creates an opportunity for a novel legal strategy to 
combat TRAP laws. 
Successful arguments against government restrictions of abortion 
are often made under the Fourteenth Amendment2 and the right to pri-
vacy, which are oriented around the patient and her level of access to 
the procedure. The most recent of these cases is Whole Woman’s Health 
v. Hellerstedt,3 where the Supreme Court ruled that Texas state laws 
created an “undue burden” on abortion access for “women seeking a 
previability abortion.”4 Such due process and privacy arguments can be 
muddy. For example, privacy rights are somewhat amorphous because 
no particular amendment enumerates such rights. Additionally, other 
Fourteenth Amendment arguments, such as equal protection, have not 
 
 1 Meaghan Winter, Why It’s So Hard to Run an Abortion Clinic, BLOOMBERG BUSINESSWEEK 
(Feb. 24, 2016), http://www.bloomberg.com/features/2016-abortion-business/ [https://perma.cc/VA 
9Y-EZF4]. 
 2 U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1. 
 3 136 S. Ct. 2292 (2016). 
 4 Id. at 2303. 
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been effective in advancing abortion rights, despite the call for sex 
equality arguments from pro-choice attorneys and advocates.5 
Instead of relying on the more traditional strategies to fight bur-
densome abortion regulations, abortion clinics could try a different tack 
to fight against government restrictions, like licensing and facility re-
quirements, which “go beyond what is necessary to ensure patients’ 
safety.”6 Using an argument based on property rights and treating abor-
tion clinics like privately owned businesses, clinic owners and other pro-
choice parties could argue that the special regulations that target abor-
tion providers constitute a regulatory taking, violating the Takings 
Clause of the Fifth Amendment, which states that “private property 
[shall not] be taken for public use, without just compensation.”7 Because 
abortion clinics exist as workplaces and strive to operate as any other 
healthcare facility, a takings analysis seems especially apt. Addition-
ally, many states with conservative legislatures (that is, states more 
likely to enact abortion restrictions) have relatively expansive laws pro-
tecting property rights. In this way, proving a taking will likely be less 
onerous in these states than the typical strategies lawyers use to pro-
tect abortion rights. 
This Comment argues for applying the Takings Clause to abortion 
clinic regulations. In doing so, Part II of this Comment will begin with 
a description of average abortion clinic operations, including the finan-
cial and legal issues they tend to face in the United States. Part III will 
describe the current state of abortion law and then focus on the law of 
regulatory takings. This section will mainly deal with federal takings 
law, but it will also discuss state property rights regimes. Part IV will 
apply federal takings law to typical TRAP laws that are currently in 
effect. It will also analyze the role state law might play in takings 
claims, including an analysis of Arizona’s just compensation statute in 
order to provide an example. Part IV ends with a discussion of the lim-
itations in using takings law to combat TRAP laws. The Comment will 
conclude in Part V by acknowledging potential issues that may arise 
from making a Takings Clause argument. 
 
 5 See, e.g., Priscilla J. Smith, Give Justice Ginsburg What She Wants: Using Sex Equality 
Arguments to Demand Examination of the Legitimacy of State Interests in Abortion Regulation, 34 
HARV. J.L. & GENDER 377 (2011). 
 6 State Laws and Policies: Targeted Regulation of Abortion Providers, GUTTMACHER INST. 
(Apr. 1, 2017), https://www.guttmacher.org/state-policy/explore/targeted-regulation-abortion-pro 
viders [https://perma.cc/249G-Q3J8]. 
 7 U.S. CONST. amend. V. 
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II. OPERATION OF ABORTION CLINICS IN THE UNITED STATES 
Before making the case that abortion clinic owners and directors 
should be viewed as property owners running workplaces and busi-
nesses, and thus are deserving of the Takings Clause’s protection, it is 
useful to show how abortion clinics operate. Ninety-four percent of abor-
tion procedures happen in clinics (as opposed to hospitals or private 
doctors’ offices), and independent abortion clinics perform two-thirds of 
these abortions; Planned Parenthood facilities perform the other third.8 
The fact that clinics perform such a vast majority of abortions results 
in the procedure being “siloed” from other types of medical treatment 
and reproductive healthcare.9 Therefore, clinics will often try to inte-
grate abortion care into other women’s health services in order to stay 
afloat.10 
Many clinics, even if not a part of Planned Parenthood, are often 
part of a somewhat larger network.11 Although Planned Parenthood is 
a nonprofit organization, many small clinics have for-profit status and 
so must operate as businesses in a more conventional way.12 While 
there is no doctrinal difference between nonprofits and other property 
owners in their ability to bring takings claims, the fact that many clin-
ics must operate as for-profits makes the financial losses they suffer 
because of TRAP laws more acute. The following sections will describe 
the various types of issues that make operating an abortion clinic diffi-
cult and make the industry unstable. However, many of the legal and 
financial hurdles clinics deal with often bleed into each other, as the 
legal attacks on clinics will purposely create financial obstacles. 
A. Legal Issues Clinics Face 
The Supreme Court has held that a woman’s right to an abortion 
can only be regulated to further the state’s interest in protecting poten-
tial life and the health of the mother.13 When such state regulations 
create a substantial obstacle for a woman to get an abortion, the regu-
lations are an impermissible means of serving the state’s legitimate 
 
 8 Madeleine Schwartz, Abortion Clinics in Blue States Are Closing, Too, FIVETHIRTYEIGHT 
(May 2, 2016), http://fivethirtyeight.com/features/abortion-clinics-in-blue-states-are-closing-too/ 
[https://perma.cc/F25W-ZATP]. 
 9 Id. 
 10 Id. 
 11 Id. For example, Women’s Health Specialists of California is a group of six abortion clinics, 
and Whole Woman’s Health (the plaintiff in the 2016 Supreme Court decision) is a network of 
seven clinics throughout the United States. 
 12 Id. 
 13 Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833 (1992). 
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ends and are thus unconstitutional.14 This doctrine comes from Planned 
Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey,15 which states that 
the government can regulate pre-viability abortions as long as such reg-
ulations do not create an “undue burden” on a woman’s decision to have 
the procedure.16 
Recently, the Supreme Court reaffirmed the validity of this test in 
Whole Woman’s Health.17 In that case, the Court struck down a 2013 
Texas state bill (H.B. 2), which had two provisions: one required all 
abortion clinics to be ambulatory surgical centers, and the other re-
quired doctors performing abortions to have admitting privileges at lo-
cal hospitals.18 These requirements put an enormous burden on the 
abortion clinics in Texas and caused many of them to close; the added 
cost to any clinic of running an ambulatory surgical center is $40,000 
per month.19 The result of the enactment of H.B. 2 was that “almost 
half” of the clinics in Texas were forced to shut down.20 Additionally, it 
is worth noting that the “two requirements [in H.B. 2] erect a particu-
larly high barrier for poor, rural, or disadvantaged women.”21 
The majority in Whole Woman’s Health held that the provisions of 
H.B. 2 did not confer medical benefits sufficient enough to justify the 
burdens they imposed on women seeking to exercise their constitutional 
right to an abortion.22 Whether an appeals court should defer to the trial 
court’s factual findings regarding the veracity of medical benefits of 
abortion regulations remains unclear, but in Whole Woman’s Health, 
the Court agreed with the trial court’s findings and concluded that the 
provisions unconstitutionally imposed an undue burden.23 
The malleable nature of the “undue burden” standard24 and the un-
certain role privacy plays in abortion rights both suggest that a differ-
 
 14 Id. 
 15 505 U.S. 833 (1992). 
 16 Id. at 874 (“Only where state regulation imposes an undue burden on a woman’s ability to 
make this decision does the power of the State reach into the heart of the liberty protected by the 
Due Process Clause.”). 
 17 Whole Woman’s Health v. Hellerstedt, 136 S. Ct. 2292 (2016). 
 18 Id. at 2300. 
 19 Winter, supra note 1. 
 20 Whole Woman’s Health, 136 S. Ct. at 2301. 
 21 Id. at 2302. 
 22 Id. at 2299. 
 23 See id. at 2302. 
 24 The malleable nature of the undue burden standard is evident from the fact that abortion 
restrictions are often upheld, even after application of the standard, and in inconsistent ways. 
Compare Stenberg v. Carhart, 530 U.S. 914 (2000) (invalidating a law prohibiting, inter alia, the 
dilation and evacuation procedure on undue burden grounds), with Gonzales v. Carhart, 550 U.S. 
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ent approach to fighting abortion regulations, particularly those target-
ing clinics, may help more clinics stay open. Rather than relying on the 
traditional argumentation in abortion cases, pro-choice advocates 
would benefit from finding an alternative method to secure abortion 
rights, especially since abortion regulations are so costly to clinics. 
Despite the recent Supreme Court ruling in Whole Woman’s 
Health, TRAP laws similar to H.B. 2 are still in effect in twenty-five 
states in the United States.25 These laws generally regulate either the 
facility itself where abortion procedures are performed or the physi-
cians who perform them.26 In some conservative states, such as North 
Dakota, anti-abortion bills can come up every two years; clinics in these 
states often rely on nonprofit legal organizations, such as the Center for 
Reproductive Rights, to help keep their doors open.27 
Anti-abortion legislation is one of the top reasons why clinics have 
closed down or stopped providing abortions since 2011.28 Abortion clinic 
restrictions from roughly 2011 to 2016 have exacerbated the closures of 
abortion clinics nationwide.29 Much of this legislation has an economic 
impact on clinic owners and their employees. For example, half of all 
states restrict abortion coverage in private insurance plans offered 
through Affordable Care Act exchanges.30 Additionally, Republican 
state legislatures often slash public funding for any group associated 
with an abortion provider, causing some clinics to shut down.31 In fact, 
cuts to family-planning dollars caused two clinics in Texas to close even 
before the laws at issue in Whole Woman’s Health went into effect.32 In 
this way, many of the legal challenges aimed at clinics directly create 
the financial challenges that also threaten to close them. 
 
124, 164 (2007) (holding that a law prohibiting the same procedure did not create an undue bur-
den); see also Greenville Women’s Clinic v. Bryant, 222 F.3d 157, 170 (4th Cir. 2000) (holding that 
state regulations that would make it more difficult and expensive to get an abortion did not pose 
an undue burden). 
 25 Targeted Regulation of Abortion Providers, supra note 6. 
 26 Id. 
 27 Id. 
 28 Esmé E. Deprez, Abortion Clinics Are Closing at a Record Pace, BLOOMBERG BUSINESSWEEK 
(Feb. 24, 2016), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2016-02-24/abortion-clinics-are-closing-
at-a-record-pace [https://perma.cc/6AB2-P2FP] (citing data from U.S. Census Bureau). 
 29 Danielle Paquette, Why Abortion Clinics in the U.S. Are Rapidly Closing, WASH. POST (Feb. 
25, 2016), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/wonk/wp/2016/02/25/why-americas-abortion-cli 
nics-are-rapidly-closing/?utm_term=.216097351eb1 [https://perma.cc/E27U-5B2Z]. 
 30 Schwartz, supra note 8. 
 31 Olga Khazan, Hell for Abortion Providers, ATLANTIC (June 27, 2016), http://www.theatlan 
tic.com/health/archive/2016/06/hell-for-abortion-providers/488315/ [https://perma.cc/LZP8-JRZH]. 
 32 Id. 
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B. Financial Issues Clinics Face 
Aside from the direct state action that causes financial hardship to 
abortion clinic owners, other external issues also contribute. All clinics 
try to keep the price of abortion as low as possible because forty-two 
percent of women who seek abortions live below the poverty line.33 In 
order to make sure that most patients seeking the procedure can get it, 
clinics’ fees for abortion services are often too low to make any profit, 
and reimbursements from Medicaid and other insurance plans are too 
small and infrequent to make a difference.34 One clinic owner, for ex-
ample, reported that Medicaid owed the clinic $90,000 in backlogged 
claims.35 Economic difficulties operating a clinic, a generally hostile en-
vironment, and declining demand for the procedure make running an 
abortion clinic a risky venture. Even in traditionally liberal states, clin-
ics can have a hard time staying open. One clinic office manager has 
even said, “We have cut salaries. We haven’t given raises. We’re still 
hanging on by our fingernails.”36 In this way, clinic owners’ responsibil-
ities as employers to their employees are unstable in the abortion clinic 
context. 
However, despite the fact that the cost of the procedure has re-
mained stable throughout the years, running a clinic has become more 
expensive.37 A clinic in upstate New York reported that for every patient 
who gets an abortion through Medicaid, a clinic loses around ninety to 
a hundred dollars. Additionally, innovation in the abortion procedure 
itself has added costs: medication abortion now accounts for a third of 
all abortions, but it costs more than surgical abortion.38 The laws that 
directly attack clinics, and the sources of their funding, often make 
these financial hurdles more dire by adding extra costs to clinics whose 
operations are already financially precarious. 
C. Hostile Environment 
In addition to the economic and legal opposition to which clinics are 
exposed, hostile climate and harassment also contribute to the difficulty 
 
 33 Schwartz, supra note 8. 
 34 Id. 
 35 Id. 
 36 Id. 
 37 Id. 
 38 Id. Research indicates that the increased cost of medical abortion “may reflect the cost of 
the drug . . . and the greater perceived need for active follow-up of medical abortion clients, to 
ensure that the abortion was completed without complications.” Stanley K. Henshaw & Lawrence 
B. Finer, The Accessibility of Abortion Services in the United States, 2001, 35 PERSP. ON SEXUAL & 
REPROD. HEALTH 16, 23 (2003). 
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of running a clinic. Abortion remains a controversial subject, and its 
opponents use various means to combat access to the procedure and its 
providers. Some protestors photograph patients and their license plate 
numbers. One Planned Parenthood facility in Midland, Texas reported 
that anti-abortion groups would trace patients’ license plates to their 
addresses and then mail threatening letters to their homes purporting 
to be from Planned Parenthood.39 The same clinic once had a contractor 
quit during renovations of the facility because someone had threatened 
his life.40 At least five clinics since 2011 have cited hostile climate as 
the reason they shut down or stopped providing abortion services.41 
Such hostility, combined with the mounting legal and financial 
struggles most clinics face, make abortion clinics an unsteady industry, 
especially for the employees who work there. A 2014 survey of abortion 
providers and clinics indicate that 51.9 percent of clinics face “threats 
and targeted intimidation” directed at doctors and staff.42 Such intimi-
dation can include the “distribution of pamphlets targeting doctors and 
clinic staff” with personal information printed on them.43 The risk of 
intimidation and threats likely impact the ability of clinic employees to 
enjoy comfort and security in their jobs. 
Physicians themselves also face social and structural hurdles 
within the field of medicine that make them willing, but unable, to pro-
vide abortion care. In her book on why doctors are constrained in choos-
ing whether to provide abortions, sociologist Lori Freedman argues that 
physicians who do want to offer abortions to their patients generally 
could only do so by working in abortion clinics rather than in their prac-
tices or in hospitals.44 “The result is that providing abortions can mean 
giving up practicing the bulk of what they are trained to do,” and many 
physicians choose not to limit their practices in such a way.45 An obste-
trician may worry that becoming an abortion provider “means giving up 
credibility as a generalist,” resulting in “only the most politically moti-
vated doctors . . . left to the task.”46 
 
 39 Khazan, supra note 31. 
 40 Id. 
 41 Deprez, supra note 28. 
 42 2014 National Clinic Violence Survey, FEMINIST MAJORITY FOUND. (Oct. 2014), http://femi 
nist.org/rrights/pdf/2014NCAPsurvey.pdf [https://perma.cc/97MQ-LL3V]. 
 43 Id. 
 44 LORI FREEDMAN, WILLING AND UNABLE: DOCTORS’ CONSTRAINTS IN ABORTION CARE 145 
(2010). 
 45 Id. 
 46 Id. 
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III. THE STATE OF RELEVANT TAKINGS LAW 
Although the particular H.B. 2 TRAP laws in Texas are no longer 
valid, anti-abortion advocates recognize that an effective way to curb 
abortion access is by targeting the clinics themselves. Thirteen states 
currently have effective laws requiring doctors providing abortions to 
have admission privileges at local hospitals or some alternative agree-
ment, and twenty-one states require clinics to have structural stand-
ards comparable to surgical centers (both of which were at issue in 
Whole Woman’s Health).47 Aside from these laws, other TRAP laws are 
still in effect in twenty-five states. Because they either are of a different 
nature or may be less onerous than the laws in Whole Woman’s Health, 
such laws may currently be safe from invalidation by the courts.48 That 
is, despite the success of pro-choice advocates in Whole Woman’s Health, 
TRAP laws still loom as a challenge for abortion clinics. 
To fight laws that target the clinic owner instead of the patient, 
legal arguments should focus on the clinic owner as well. One way to do 
this is for clinic owners to argue that TRAP laws deprive them of their 
rights as business owners and as employers and thus should constitute 
a taking that requires compensation.49 “The general rule . . . is that 
while property may be regulated to a certain extent, if regulation goes 
too far it will be recognized as a taking.”50 Supreme Court jurisprudence 
has held that in cases where a government regulation is not a per se 
taking, a court must balance three main factors: (1) the “economic im-
pact of the regulation on the claimant”; (2) “the extent to which the reg-
ulation has interfered with distinct investment-backed expectations”; 
and (3) “the character of the governmental action.”51 
A. The Benefits of a Takings Argument against TRAP Laws 
There is uncertainty in the law given the state of the Supreme 
Court and its recent decision in Whole Woman’s Health. The arguments 
used in that case and others have succeeded, but they do not always.52 
Although pro-choice activists were presumably satisfied with the out-
 
 47 Targeted Regulation of Abortion Providers, supra note 6. 
 48 Id. 
 49 The rights to privacy and reproductive choice, although firmly established by precedent, are 
not enumerated in the Constitution. Using an argument from the Fifth Amendment is perhaps 
more preferable. An explicit fundamental right is often better than an implied one. 
 50 Pa. Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 415 (1922). 
 51 Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. City of New York, 438 U.S. 104, 124–25 (1978). 
 52 See, e.g., Gonzales v. Carhart, 550 U.S. 124, 147 (2007). 
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come of Whole Woman’s Health, given its clarification and arguable ex-
pansion of the “undue burden” standard, anti-abortion legislatures will 
likely enact different TRAP laws that attempt to diminish access to 
abortion. Additionally, Whole Woman’s Health might not prevent a reg-
ulatory “creep,” where legislatures pass anti-abortion regulations incre-
mentally to avoid a judicial finding of undue burden that was clearly 
demonstrated in the far-reaching nature of H.B. 2 in Whole Woman’s 
Health. Therefore, it remains to be seen whether Whole Woman’s Health 
will be a barrier to TRAP laws in the future or more of a Band-Aid. 
Takings law is another strategy that may be easier for an advocate 
to use in court rather than proving an undue burden. To show why it 
may be easier, take the following example: Texas passes a new TRAP 
law that has the effect of closing down one of three abortion clinics in 
Houston but does not close other abortion clinics throughout the state. 
If the closed abortion clinic were to sue Texas in order to overturn the 
new law, the owner would likely lose under an undue burden standard. 
This is because undue burden analysis may require a focus on broader 
markets and “customers,” i.e., women seeking abortions: if only one in 
three clinics in Houston shut down, the “market” for abortion does not 
significantly decrease. In other words, the clinic that shut down would 
likely not make a difference in terms of access to abortion for women in 
Texas, and in such a case a court may not find that there is an undue 
burden sufficient to overturn the regulation. 
Takings claims, on the other hand, are not usually centered on 
broader markets; they instead focus on an individual’s property rights 
and how invasive the government action is with regard to the property. 
In the Houston example above, the single abortion clinic that had to 
shut down because of the new law would have a strong argument that 
the law was a regulatory taking; what generally matters most for that 
analysis is how much of a loss the individual property owner takes as a 
result of the law.53 
B. Elements of a Federal Takings Claim 
The notion of regulatory takings originated in the Supreme Court 
case Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon,54 where Justice Holmes held that 
“[t]he general rule . . . is that while property may be regulated to a cer-
tain extent, if regulation goes too far it will be recognized as a taking.”55 
 
 53 See Penn Cent. Transp. Co., 438 U.S. 104. 
 54 260 U.S. 393 (1922). 
 55 Id. at 415. 
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Penn Central Transportation Co. v. City of New York56 was the Supreme 
Court’s effort to add substance to the Pennsylvania Coal test of “goes 
too far.” The Court did this by constructing a four-part standard. A court 
is to consider: (1) the economic impact of the regulation on the plaintiff; 
(2) the plaintiff’s distinct investment-backed expectations;57 (3) the 
character of the government action (a physical invasion is more likely 
to be a taking while a broadly applicable regulation is less likely to be 
a taking); and (4) the extent to which the government is regulating nui-
sances or otherwise preventing harms.58 
The first factor—extent of the loss (i.e., the loss compared to what 
the plaintiff owned before the government regulation)—is clearly sig-
nificant in concluding whether a compensable taking has occurred. The 
second factor, distinct investment-backed expectations, may be ex-
plained because making actual improvements in the land helps allay 
any concerns about problems of proof on the part of the party claiming 
a taking: if the government enacts a restriction on land, it is always 
possible for a landowner to claim that, but for the restriction, she was 
just about to begin a hugely profitable real estate development, for ex-
ample. The law privileges investments that landowners make prior to 
the regulation’s implementation (other than simply purchasing the 
land).59 
The third factor—character of the government action—seems to 
suggest a hierarchy for different uses of property. Permanent physical 
occupations are virtually certain to result in takings under Loretto v. 
Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp.,60 whereas temporary physical 
invasions are somewhat likely to be takings under Penn Central, and 
pure regulations are the least likely to be takings.61 Despite the fact 
that regulatory takings tend to be more difficult to prove compared to 
physical invasions of property, substantial harm to the plaintiff (in the 
form of economic loss) should probably result in a taking.62 Another fac-
 
 56 438 U.S. 104 (1978). 
 57 JESSE DUKEMINIER, ET AL., PROPERTY 1176–77 (8th ed. 2014). 
 58 Id. at 1150–51. 
 59 See, e.g., Frank I. Michelman, Property, Utility, and Fairness: Comments on the Ethical 
Foundations of “Just Compensation” Law, 80 HARV. L. REV. 1165, 1234 (1967) (“The zoned-out 
apartment house owner no longer has the apartment investment he depended on, whereas the 
nearby land speculator who is unable to show that he has yet formed any specific plans for his 
vacant land still has a package of possibilities with its value, though lessened, still unspecified—
which is what he had before.”). 
 60 458 U.S. 419 (1982). 
 61 See DUKEMINIER, supra note 57, at 1144, 1161. 
 62 See Lingle v. Chevron U.S.A. Inc., 544 U.S. 528, 539 (2005) (“[regulatory takings inquiries 
aim] to identify regulatory actions that are functionally equivalent to the classic taking in which 
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tor, though not explicit in Penn Central, is whether the government in-
terference is preventing a harm or nuisance versus forcing a benefit. 
Forcing a benefit is more likely to be a compensable taking, while pre-
venting a harm or nuisance tends to be justifiable motivation for gov-
ernment interference on the use of private property that need not be 
compensated.63 That being said, determining whether a law forces a 
benefit or prevents a nuisance is often in the eye of the beholder, and 
such analysis may depend on how a court characterizes the regulation.64 
To help clarify when a regulation “goes too far,” subsequent Su-
preme Court opinions have created concepts of per se, or total, takings 
and partial regulatory takings.65 Per se regulatory takings usually in-
volve permanent, physical occupation of a property owner’s land.66 Be-
cause TRAP laws will rarely create per se takings (as they do not tend 
to involve physical occupation of the property), the assumption here is 
that abortion clinic owners will only be able to claim partial regulatory 
takings. In those cases, a court must balance at least the three enumer-
ated Penn Central factors to determine whether a partial regulatory 
taking has taken place: (1) economic impact of the regulation on the 
property owner, (2) degree of interference with the owner’s reasonable 
investment-backed expectations, and (3) character of the taking.67 
The extent to which a government regulation appears to single out 
a particular property owner is a factor that may play an important, but 
less explicit, role in takings inquiries. Professor Saul Levmore, in de-
scribing patterns in takings law, has made the following assessment: 
[W]hen the government singles out a private party, in the sense 
that the government’s aims could have been achieved in many 
ways but the means chosen placed losses on an individual or on 
persons who are not part of an existing or easily organized polit-
ical coalition, then we can expect to find a compensable taking. 
Thus, most taxes and rent control schemes are not compensable 
takings because they are the products of political exchanges. . . . 
 
government directly appropriates private property or ousts the owner from his domain. Accord-
ingly, each of these tests focuses directly upon the severity of the burden that government imposes 
upon private property rights”) (emphasis added). 
 63 See, e.g., Hadacheck v. Sebastian, 239 U.S. 394 (1915); Robert Meltz, Takings Law Today: 
A Primer for the Perplexed, 34 ECOLOGY L.Q. 307, 343 (2007) (“a government restriction viewed as 
creating a public benefit (e.g., a park) is compensable, while a restriction seen as averting a public 
harm (e.g., pollution) is not”). 
 64 A court hostile to abortion rights, for example, might find a particular TRAP law prevents 
a nuisance, while a more sympathetic court might find that it forces an (unnecessary) benefit, 
making it compensable. 
 65 Meltz, supra note 63, at 329. 
 66 See Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 433 (1982). 
 67 Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. City of New York, 438 U.S. 104, 124 (1978). 
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In contrast, individuals who are subjected to “spot zoning” are 
often politically unprotected, because they are burdened in a 
way that makes it unlikely that they can find political allies, and 
takings law will often protect them from majoritarian exploita-
tion.68 
In other words, courts appear to be more willing to find that a taking 
has occurred when the government regulation at issue appears to be 
singling out, or “spot zoning,” an individual (or perhaps a small and/or 
politically unpopular group of individuals) for adverse treatment. “The 
rationale appears to be that singling out offends ‘fairness and justice’ 
and suggests bad faith, or points to an absence of average reciprocity of 
advantage.”69 Levmore’s assessment is in line with one of the Supreme 
Court’s factors in Pennsylvania Coal—whether there is an “average rec-
iprocity of advantage.”70 This phrase is “understood to mean that the 
owner has not been singled out for adverse treatment, but instead is 
simply being required to abide by a reasonably general requirement of 
widespread applicability.”71 Therefore, the kind of “spot zoning” and tar-
geted regulation abortion clinic owners face (which other healthcare fa-
cilities do not) may strongly support the finding of a compensable tak-
ing.72 
It is worth noting that even if abortion clinic directors do not own 
the land on which they operate their clinics, but instead lease the land 
from another party, they can still recover under the Fifth Amendment. 
The Supreme Court has stated, “It has long been established that the 
holder of an unexpired leasehold interest in land is entitled, under the 
Fifth Amendment, to just compensation for the value of that interest 
when it is taken upon condemnation by the United States.”73 I use the 
term “clinic owner” throughout this Comment for simplicity, but the 
constitutional takings analysis should be no different if a clinic director 
does not own a fee simple interest in the property but instead leases the 
land on which the clinic operates. Whether this holds true for the state 
statutory claims discussed in the next Section is less clear, but given 
 
 68 Saul Levmore, Takings, Torts, and Special Interests, 77 VA. L. REV. 1333, 1344–45 (1991). 
 69 Meltz, supra note 63, at 346. 
 70 Pa. Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 415 (1922). Note that Penn Central does not include 
this factor in its enumeration of the relevant considerations. 
 71 DAVID A. DANA & THOMAS W. MERRILL, PROPERTY: TAKINGS 153 (2002). 
 72 See, e.g., id. at 134 (noting that “there may be other factors [than those in Penn Central and 
Pennsylvania Coal] courts will identify as being relevant to the regulatory takings analysis”). 
 73 Alamo Land & Cattle Co. v. Arizona, 424 U.S. 295, 303 (1976). See also Meltz, supra note 
63, at 319 (“Almost all interests in land are recognized as ‘property’ under the Takings Clause, 
from fee simples to leaseholds, easements, liens, life estates, and some future interests.”). 
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that lessees have property interest in the land they lease, it is likely 
that statutory takings claims are available to lessees as well. 
C. States’ Expansion of Property Rights 
State legislatures are free to provide more protection for property 
owners than the Supreme Court mandates under the Fifth Amend-
ment’s Takings Clause. That is, the Court arguably creates a floor, ra-
ther than a ceiling, of protection from regulatory takings. Many state 
legislatures have enacted protective laws for property rights or other-
wise expanded the means by which landowners can be compensated for 
government regulation that diminishes their property value or limits 
the use of their property. This expansion of property rights had its hey-
day in the 1990s and early 2000s.74 Many of the states enacting or 
amending their laws have conservative legislatures.75 This means that 
the states most likely to restrict abortion access going forward are also 
more likely to have laws that are more amenable to takings claims. 
There are generally three types of property rights laws that states 
have enacted. One type is called “an assessment law, which requires 
state or local agencies to assess takings of private property rights before 
their regulations can become effective.”76 This is considered a proce-
dural requirement rather than a substantive one.77 The next type of 
state property law is called a “compensation law, [which] requires state 
and local governments to compensate property owners once their prop-
erty value is reduced by a certain percentage or when the use of their 
property is ‘inordinately burdened’ by state and local regulations.”78 The 
last type is “a combination of both assessment and compensation 
laws.”79 
 
 74 See Meltz, supra note 63, at 311 & n.7 (“some states have recently adopted statutory routes 
by which landowners may obtain compensation or regulatory relief from government restrictions”); 
see generally ILYA SOMIN, THE GRASPING HAND: “KELO V. CITY OF NEW LONDON” AND THE LIMITS 
OF EMINENT DOMAIN 141–60 (2015). 
 75 Hannah Jacobs, Note, Searching for Balance in the Aftermath of the 2006 Takings Initia-
tives, 116 YALE L. J. 1518, 1524–26 & n.40 (2007) (“Republican groups . . . supported the regulatory 
takings initiatives in their states. . . . Legislatures in Florida, Louisiana, Mississippi, and Texas 
have passed legislation providing compensation opportunities for partial regulatory takings. . . . 
And at least seventeen states require governments to assess the impacts of potential takings before 
enacting legislation.”). Note that Florida, Louisiana, Mississippi, and Texas, as well as ten of those 
seventeen states, have all enacted TRAP laws, according to the Guttmacher Institute, supra note 
6. 
 76 Daowei Zhang, State Property Rights Laws: What, Where, and How?, 94 J. FORESTRY 10, 11 
(1996). 
 77 Id. 
 78 Id. 
 79 Id. 
28 SILBERSTEIN PROOF G.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 12/13/17  12:33 PM 
737] TAKING ON TRAP LAWS 751 
 
Most states that enacted such property rights legislation have the 
assessment type of statute. These statutes (as well as the ones with a 
combination of assessment and compensation laws) require government 
entities—often an agency and/or attorney general—to produce and dis-
close an analysis of how the adoption of a law or regulation could reduce 
private property values.80 However, most relevant to the inquiry of 
whether TRAP laws could constitute a regulatory taking are the com-
pensation laws. These kinds of laws “establish a remedy if property use 
is partially restricted by governmental actions,” as opposed to the per-
haps more stringent federal case law that requires a substantial—if not 
virtually complete—loss before a regulatory taking is found.81 
For example, the state of Florida has its own law separate from 
federal takings law—and in fact creates a separate cause of action—
that provides extra protection. The statute itself begins with the follow-
ing explanation: 
[I]t is the intent of the Legislature that, as a separate and dis-
tinct cause of action from the law of takings, the Legislature 
herein provides for relief, or payment of compensation, when a 
new law, rule, regulation, or ordinance of the state or a political 
entity in the state, as applied, unfairly affects real property.82 
Florida’s is perhaps one of the most landowner-friendly state property 
laws, as it does not have a threshold percentage of economic loss in or-
der to qualify for compensation. Rather, the only requirement is that 
the private property rights be “inordinately burden[ed].”83 If a Florida 
abortion clinic owner were to argue under state law, as opposed to the 
U.S. Constitution, that a TRAP law raised her operating costs so high 
that she was unable to operate her existing clinic, it appears more likely 
that a court would find a compensable taking. 
Texas84 and Michigan85 have adopted assessment/compensation 
statutes, which require that the government both relax the burden on 
property owners to prove that government action has resulted in a com-
pensable taking and assess whether future regulation could affect pri-
vate property value. Other states simply have assessment statutes that 
 
 80 See, e.g., TEX. ATT’Y GEN., PRIVATE REAL PROPERTY RIGHTS PRESERVATION ACT 
GUIDELINES, https://www.texasattorneygeneral.gov/agency/private-real-property-rights-preserva 
tion-act-guidelines [https://perma.cc/ZM5V-PXXU]. 
 81 Zhang, supra note 76, at 12 (emphasis added). 
 82 FLA. STAT. § 70.001(1). 
 83 Id. 
 84 TEX. GOV’T CODE §§ 2007.001–2007.045. 
 85 MICH. COMP. LAWS §§ 24.421–24.425. 
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require procedural compliance, but they do not have any substantive 
components changing the state and federal government’s existing tak-
ings law. Despite what is a procedural requirement, a state’s failure to 
conduct an assessment when one is required could result in the repeal 
of the underlying regulation. For example, Texas’s property protection 
statute states: “A governmental action requiring a takings impact as-
sessment is void if an assessment is not prepared. A private real prop-
erty owner affected by a governmental action taken without the prepa-
ration of a takings impact assessment as required . . . may bring suit 
for a declaration of the invalidity of the governmental action.”86 There-
fore, if TRAP laws are made without such assessments, abortion clinic 
owners may have a cause of action even without having to make a reg-
ulatory takings claim. 
D. Precedent Supporting TRAP Laws as Regulatory Takings 
The argument that government regulations targeting abortion clin-
ics should be compensable takings is a novel approach. As such, there 
are no cases that deal directly with the argument. A case that strongly 
supports this interpretation of regulatory takings, however, is PA 
Northwestern Distributors, Inc. v. Zoning Hearing Board of the Town-
ship of Moon.87 In that case, the Township’s zoning board created a 
land-use ordinance just four days after an adult bookstore opened. The 
ordinance required that any enterprise with a preexisting use that con-
flicted with the ordinance become compliant within ninety days. Be-
cause the new ordinance did not designate the area for adult commer-
cial use, the adult bookstore’s preexisting use conflicted with the 
ordinance, and it had to vacate.88 The Pennsylvania Supreme Court 
ruled that the Township’s ordinance violated the Pennsylvania Consti-
tution on its face because it, and other laws like it, could deprive people 
of their property at any arbitrary time and thus was a taking without 
just compensation.89 The court concluded: 
if we were to permit the [ordinance], any use could be amortized 
out of existence without just compensation. Although such a zon-
ing option seems reasonable when the use involves some activity 
that may be distasteful to some members of the public, no use 
 
 86 TEX. GOV’T CODE § 2007.044(a). 
 87 584 A.2d 1372, 1375 (Pa. 1991) (“municipalities lack the power to compel a change in the 
nature of an existing lawful use of property”). 
 88 Id. at 1376. 
 89 PA. CONST. art. I, § 10 (“private property [shall not] be taken or applied to public use, with-
out authority of law and without just compensation being first made or secured”). 
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would be exempt from the reach of amortization, and any prop-
erty owner could lose the use of his or her property without com-
pensation. Even a homeowner could find one day that his or her 
“castle” had become a nonconforming use and would be required 
to vacate the premises within some arbitrary period of time, 
without just compensation.90 
Abortion clinic owners could argue that TRAP laws are analogous to the 
zoning ordinance at issue in PA Northwestern Distributors, especially 
given the moral tinge abortion regulations often have. 
The closest directly related case may be P.L.S. Partners, Women’s 
Medical Center of Rhode Island, Inc. v. City of Cranston,91 where part-
ners in a proposed outpatient abortion clinic sued the government for 
impeding on the facility’s construction by requiring a special use permit 
to operate as a hospital.92 The plaintiff partners argued, among other 
things, that the special use permit requirement—and the classification 
of the facility as a hospital—was an unconstitutional taking. The court 
ruled, however, that the Takings Clause question was not properly be-
fore the court because the plaintiffs had not applied for the permit be-
fore suing.93 Given that this case never reached an answer on the tak-
ings question, it appears that no court has ruled explicitly on the TRAP-
laws-as-takings argument. 
IV. APPLICATION OF TAKINGS LAW TO ABORTION CLINIC REGULATIONS 
The Penn Central factors discussed in the previous Part arguably 
weigh in favor of abortion clinic owners affected by TRAP laws. In a 
recent documentary that follows the daily operations of clinics in the 
South that were subjected to strict regulation by the state, Dalton John-
son, the owner of Alabama Women’s Center, described his struggles 
with maintaining his facility: 
We had to relocate into a new facility to meet the new healthcare 
codes. Finding financing to purchase an abortion clinic is next to 
impossible. I refinanced my property downtown, pulled all the 
equity out and then took all the money out of my retirement, so 
I’ve spent close to a million dollars to meet all of their require-
ments; and you think you’re done and . . . they’re trying to pass 
another bill that says I can’t be [with]in two thousand feet of a 
 
 90 PA Nw. Distribs., 584 A.2d at 1376. 
 91 696 F. Supp. 788 (D.R.I. 1988). 
 92 Id. at 790–91. 
 93 Id. at 795–96. 
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school. . . . I thought that “okay, I’ve met every requirement 
they’ve had, you know, I have a nice facility,” that they would, 
you know, leave me alone and move on, but that’s not happen-
ing.94 
From his experience, Johnson could argue that, under all three Penn 
Central factors, the laws targeting his clinic are a taking and that the 
state of Alabama should compensate him. 
A. Application of the Penn Central Factors to Abortion Clinic 
Regulations 
For the purposes of the following analysis, I am going to assume 
that TRAP laws are statutes or zoning requirements that apply only to 
abortion clinics and increase the cost of operating such clinics. In my 
analysis, I often apply each factor to the kinds of TRAP laws at issue in 
Whole Woman’s Health, such as those that require clinics to have struc-
tural standards comparable to those for surgical centers. Although I 
recognize that Whole Woman’s Health invalidated those specific laws, 
as of April 1, 2017 twenty-two states still have in effect one or both of 
the Texas H.B. 2-type regulations that require surgical center facilities 
and admitting privileges.95 Pro-choice advocates will probably continue 
to challenge these state laws under Whole Woman’s Health, but undue 
burden analysis may not work in striking them all down when a state’s 
particular circumstances and/or the specific characteristics of the law 
differ from Texas’s. 
1. The economic impact of the regulation on a clinic owner 
The first, and the most important, factor in a regulatory taking 
analysis is how substantial a loss the property owner suffered because 
of the government regulation.96 The fundamental question is, “How 
much diminution in value is enough to qualify as a taking?”97 Usually 
courts calculate the extent of the loss as a fraction, that is, the numer-
ator is the loss and the denominator is the value of what the plaintiff 
had before the regulation.98 If a regulation forces a clinic to shut down, 
then this factor strongly points toward a taking. 
 
 94 TRAPPED (Big Mouth Productions, Cedar Creek Productions, & Trilogy Films 2016). 
 95 See Targeted Regulation of Abortion Providers, supra note 6. 
 96 See DANA & MERRILL, supra note 71, at 134 (“The factor that seems most securely grounded 
in the decisions . . . is the extent to which the regulation has diminished the value of the claimant’s 
property.”). 
 97 Id. at 135. 
 98 Id. (“[no] courts have developed any clear benchmarks as to what percentage diminution 
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However, regulations targeted at abortion clinics do not lower the 
property value per se; they just limit the use value of the property. 
Therefore, some courts might calculate the fraction to reflect the differ-
ence in profit before or after the regulation. Either way, most TRAP 
laws subject abortion clinic owners to significant economic losses, 
whether through financial or facility-related regulations. With regard 
to the surgical center requirement at issue in Whole Woman’s Health, 
the District Court found that: 
The “cost of coming into compliance” with the surgical-center re-
quirement “for existing clinics is significant,” “undisputedly ap-
proach[ing] 1 million dollars,” and “most likely exceed[ing] 1.5 
million dollars,” with “[s]ome . . . clinics” unable to “comply due 
to physical size limitations of their sites.” . . . The “cost of acquir-
ing land and constructing a new compliant clinic will likely ex-
ceed three million dollars.”99 
Assuming that other regulations requiring comparable standards to 
those for surgical centers also impose such high costs, clinic owners can 
readily show substantial loss. 
As mentioned above, such calculations may be unnecessary if a reg-
ulation forces an abortion clinic to shut down entirely. It would be dif-
ficult for any court to argue that such a result would not have a sub-
stantial economic impact on the plaintiff abortion clinic owner. 
Additionally, such a result could hardly be called a “partial taking.” A 
regulation that forces a property owner to stop the preexisting use of 
their property could be sufficient for some courts to find a compensable 
taking.100 “[W]hen a landowner can show that the regulatory restriction 
has caused a severe reduction in use and value, a reduction that is not 
caused by mere changes in the market, then considerations of fairness 
militate compensation.”101 
2. The clinic owner’s reasonable investment-backed expectations 
As Dalton Johnson’s anecdote at the beginning of this Part shows, 
abortion clinic owners often invest huge amounts of capital in order to 
 
gives rise to a presumption in favor of a finding that there has been a taking”). 
 99 Whole Woman’s Health v. Hellerstedt, 136 S. Ct. 2292, 2302–03 (2016). 
 100 See PA Nw. Distribs., Inc. v. Zoning Hearing Bd. of Twp. of Moon, 584 A.2d 1372 (Pa. 1991); 
DANA & MERRILL, supra note 71, at 135 (“if the regulation causes a 100 percent diminution in 
value, it is a taking per se”). One issue, therefore, is whether a court would conclude that a wipeout 
of use value, instead of property value, is a per se taking. 
 101 James Burling, Can the Existence of Value in Property Avert a Regulatory Taking When 
Economically Beneficial Use Has Been Destroyed?, in TAKING SIDES ON TAKINGS ISSUES: PUBLIC 
AND PRIVATE PERSPECTIVES 466–67 (Thomas E. Roberts ed., 2002). 
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start operating their clinics. Those amounts are compounded in order 
to make sure their clinics are compliant with an ever-changing land-
scape of legislation, especially in areas of the country where legislatures 
are constantly introducing anti-abortion regulations. Courts, in making 
their assessments about whether TRAP laws result in a compensable 
taking, must decide whether improvements that clinic owners make to 
their property constitute distinct investment-backed expectations. 
Judges are likely to be receptive to the injustice clinic owners face when 
they spend large amounts of their own money to comply with a law just 
to be hit again with a new law that requires them to spend even more. 
The Supreme Court, paralleling state courts’ treatment of zoning 
laws, seems to say that once owners have “vested rights” to build what 
they want, they “are entitled to compensation if permission is with-
drawn.”102 In this way, the distinct (or reasonable) investment-backed 
expectations prong is a way to incorporate the “presumption against 
retroactive lawmaking.”103 “[A]n owner who acquires property when it 
is settled that certain uses are specifically permitted by law should have 
a stronger claim to compensation if such uses are subsequently prohib-
ited.”104 The issue is that TRAP laws do not, on their face, prohibit the 
use of providing abortion services; they generally just make that use 
more costly. However, a significant increase in that cost still negatively 
affects a property owner’s reasonable investment-backed expectations. 
The Supreme Court has held, for example, that “the imposition on a 
firm of a retroactive liability for increased retirement benefits for for-
mer employees was a taking,”105 indicating that an increase in cost, as 
opposed to a newly-prohibited use, can still be a taking under the factor 
of investment-backed expectations. 
Additionally, if the law privileges property owners who have in-
vested in their property because we want to make sure that takings 
claims are sincere, then courts should easily find for plaintiff abortion 
clinic owners with regard to this factor. They have credibility because 
they have been operating a clinic already. This is not a case of a land-
owner trying to argue that if only the government had not passed the 
regulation, she would have begun a real estate development worth mil-
lions of dollars. Abortion clinics are not hugely profitable enterprises, 
and many clinics struggle to break even in order to keep the procedure 
 
 102 DANA & MERRILL, supra note 71, at 159 & n.258 (referencing Penn Central and citing 
Nectow v. City of Cambridge, 277 U.S. 183 (1928) as an example of the “vested rights doctrine”). 
 103 Id. at 160. 
 104 Id. 
 105 Id. at 162 (citing E. Enters. v. Apfel, 524 U.S. 498 (1998)). 
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affordable.106 In other words, their claims of investment-backed expec-
tations (i.e., that they expected their investments to keep their clinics 
compliant with the law) are arguably as trustworthy as other plaintiffs’, 
if not more so. 
3. The character of the government action 
The nature of the government action usually refers to whether the 
government’s infringement on a landowner’s property is a physical oc-
cupation or purely regulatory.107 This factor would arguably cut against 
an abortion clinic owner’s taking claim; the government action when it 
passes a TRAP law is just a regulation, as opposed to a permanent or 
temporary physical occupation. In such a case, the Penn Central test 
could be more difficult to satisfy. However, the strong cases that abor-
tion clinic owners can make with regard to the other factors renders 
their weakness in this factor less significant. Robert Meltz argues that, 
according to the Supreme Court, “the character factor . . . is to be given 
less weight than the previous two Penn Central factors.”108 In addition, 
when a “mere” regulation can eliminate a person’s livelihood, the char-
acter of the government action is invasive enough that a court could 
reasonably conclude a compensable taking has taken place.109 
4. Application of Pennsylvania Coal factors 
Although not explicitly enumerated in Penn Central, additional fac-
tors from Pennsylvania Coal may also be relevant in determining 
whether a taking has occurred.110 One of these factors is whether and 
to what extent the government’s regulation is preventing a harm. The 
findings of the District Court in Whole Woman’s Health are pertinent to 
analyzing this factor—namely, that abortions were extremely safe be-
fore the enactment of H.B. 2 and that the law did not improve safety.111 
 
 106 See Winter, supra note 1. 
 107 But see Meltz, supra note 63, at 341–46 (suggesting that the character of the government 
action factor should be more “elastic” and inclusive, and listing nine sub-factors that may be rele-
vant to the inquiry); DANA & MERRILL, supra note 71, at 140 (asking whether this factor does more 
than create a distinction between physical invasion and regulatory scheme). 
 108 Meltz, supra note 63, at 342 (citing Lingle v. Chevron U.S.A. Inc., 544 U.S. 528, 538–39 
(2005)). 
 109 See id. (“[analysis of the character of government action can include] a balancing of the 
public interest advanced by the government measure against the burden on the property owner”) 
(emphasis added). 
 110 See DANA & MERRILL, supra note 71, at 143–56 (listing “destruction of recognized rights of 
property,” “regulation of noxious uses,” and “average reciprocity of advantage” as three ad hoc 
factors courts use to analyze regulatory takings claims). 
 111 Whole Woman’s Health v. Hellerstedt, 136 S. Ct. 2292, 2302 (2016) (“‘The great weight of 
evidence demonstrates that, before the act’s passage, abortion in Texas was extremely safe with 
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The fact that these laws did not actually prevent any harm to women 
weighs in favor of finding a compensable taking. Despite a legislature’s 
stated reasons for enacting regulations, it is often clear that TRAP laws 
are meant to decrease abortion procedures.112 In other words, the “nui-
sance” or harm that the TRAP laws purport to solve is not actually oc-
curring. “[W]hen the government is seen as having acted in bad faith, 
courts tilt toward the plaintiff.”113 
Forcing a benefit is more likely to be a taking, while preventing a 
harm or nuisance (e.g., Hadacheck v. Sebastian114 and Pennsylvania 
Coal) is usually not compensable. Because abortions have proved to be 
quite safe, especially compared to other medical procedures,115 regula-
tions of abortion clinics are not likely going to prevent any harms. This 
being the case, it is possible for clinic owners to argue that legislatures 
are trying to force a “benefit,” thus making the regulation compensable. 
Such a benefit may be to make the procedure even safer (women’s 
health is often the stated purpose of TRAP laws); however, the “benefit” 
legislatures may actually intend is the shutdown of clinics, which would 
also be compensable. 
Whether there is average reciprocity of advantage—a factor from 
Pennsylvania Coal—may also do some work here. As discussed in Part 
III, spot-zoning and regulations that single out particular parties tend 
to predict whether takings claims are successful. In Whole Woman’s 
Health, the facts showed that Texas did not impose similar restrictions 
to other healthcare facilities that performed procedures more danger-
ous than abortion, and such a finding would also weigh in favor of a 
compensable taking.116 
 
particularly low rates of serious complications and virtually no deaths occurring on account of the 
procedure.’ ‘[R]isks are not appreciably lowered for patients who undergo abortions at ambulatory 
surgical centers as compared to nonsurgical-center facilities.’”) 
 112 See id. at 2311–12. 
 113 Meltz, supra note 63, at 345. 
 114 239 U.S. 394 (1915) (holding that an ordinance prohibiting the manufacture of bricks within 
specified city limits did not constitute a taking). 
 115 Whole Woman’s Health, 136 S. Ct. at 2311–12, 2315 (“the surgical-center provision imposes 
‘a requirement that simply is not based on differences’ between abortion and other surgical proce-
dures ‘that are reasonably related to’ preserving women’s health”). 
 116 Id. at 2315. 
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B. State Laws and Abortion Clinic Regulations 
1. State takings regimes are generally more restrictive in what 
the government can regulate without compensation 
Many states have enacted laws in reaction to Supreme Court tak-
ings jurisprudence. Some of these laws are “takings assessments,” 
which “require agencies to determine whether regulatory activity might 
constitute a taking”; other laws have reduced the necessary impact on 
value to show a taking of private property.117 
The trend in the takings reform movement has been toward de-
creasing or, most recently, eliminating the threshold values that 
trigger the right to compensation. Given the negligible or nonex-
istent threshold values in some of these states—for example, in 
Oregon and Arizona—private property owners could make a 
compensation claim if a regulation caused a mere 0.5% decrease 
in the fair market value of their land.118 
There is debate, however, about whether this trend has positive bene-
fits. Research by John Echeverria and Thekla Hansen-Young has 
shown that these “compensation” laws actually undermine community 
protection by chilling the enforcement and creation of regulations, while 
conferring benefits mainly to special interest groups.119 
Echeverria and Hansen-Young’s deep concern about the negative 
effects compensation statutes have at the state and local levels shows 
that the statutes are somewhat effective in either keeping regulation at 
a minimum or finding for property owners in state takings claims. Alt-
hough these effects are perhaps troubling on a normative level, the fact 
that they seem to exist in states with these kinds of laws may help abor-
tion clinics operating in those states. Little litigation appears to stem 
from such state laws, arguably because the “chilling effect has undoubt-
edly derailed regulatory initiatives that would have produced litigation 
if they had been implemented.”120 Although this does not have implica-
tions for how a court would deal with a TRAP law under a state takings 
regime, abortion clinic owners could likely benefit from such a chilling. 
Assuming that these laws do result in litigation at least in some 
instances, the procedural hurdles to a regulatory takings claim are 
 
 117 DUKEMINIER, supra note 57, at 1197. 
 118 Jacobs, supra note 75, at 1529. 
 119 See JOHN D. ECHEVERRIA & THEKLA HANSEN-YOUNG, THE TRACK RECORD ON TAKINGS 
LEGISLATION: LESSONS FROM DEMOCRACY’S LABORATORIES 2–3 (2008), http://scholarship.law. 
georgetown.edu/gelpi_papers/1/ [https://perma.cc/Z4LA-CNM9]. 
 120 Id. at 17. 
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much lower in some states than they are in federal takings law. Without 
the bureaucratic obstacles that keep people with only minor or moder-
ate losses from litigating their claims, more people who lose money from 
regulations of their clinics can sue.121 Therefore, the fact that a TRAP 
law did not create an economic “wipeout” of the value of a property 
would not be a barrier to entry, so to speak, for abortion clinic owners 
to make use of state takings law. 
2. Application of Arizona’s Private Property Rights 
Protection Act 
In order to get a sense of how a state takings regime might affect 
the result in a clinic owner’s takings claim, it is worth having a detailed 
look at a particular state’s statute in a state with TRAP laws. By looking 
at how state courts have interpreted that statute, we can apply the 
same reasoning to the TRAP provisions in that state. Arizona is a useful 
example for this analysis because its property rights regime is ex-
tremely generous to property owners122 and because it currently has 
TRAP laws that require both structural standards comparable to those 
for surgical centers and hospital privileges (or some alternative agree-
ment).123 Current Arizona state takings law 
requires state and local governments to compensate landowners 
whenever land use regulations diminish property values. As an 
alternative to paying compensation, the new law allows the gov-
ernmental entity imposing a regulation to exempt a landowner 
from enforcement of the value-reducing regulation. The proposi-
tion also allows governments and landowners to come to agree-
ments whereby a landowner agrees to waive the right to sue for 
compensation regarding a particular regulation.124 
In this way, the law appears quite permissive, especially compared to 
the balancing tests in the federal doctrine (i.e., Penn Central). 
There have not been many litigated cases in Arizona state courts 
since the law—known as the Private Property Rights Protection Act—
went into effect on December 7, 2006. Only eleven cases cite the rele-
vant provision on regulatory takings in the Act, and almost all of those 
 
 121 Jacobs, supra note 75, at 1529–30. 
 122 See ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 12-1134. 
 123 Targeted Regulation of Abortion Providers, supra note 6. 
 124 Jeffrey L. Sparks, Note, Land Use Regulation in Arizona After the Private Property Rights 
Protection Act, 51 ARIZ. L. REV. 211, 212–13 (2009). 
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cases involved issues with a party’s standing or the Act’s statute of lim-
itations, rather than ruling on the merits.125 The one case that did rule 
on the merits, and is therefore relevant to this Comment’s inquiry, 
found for the property owner by reversing the motion for summary judg-
ment granted to the city.126 It is worth noting, however, that this gen-
eral lack of litigation may support the claim that Arizona’s Private 
Property Restoration Act did in fact chill the enactment of land use reg-
ulation.127 Alex Potapov claims that “many scholars believe that forcing 
the government to compensate landowners for the cost imposed by reg-
ulations actually improves government decisionmaking,”128 so perhaps 
the relative lack of litigation in the decade since Arizona passed the Act 
is consistent with that theory. 
Before looking at the case law, however, it is useful to examine the 
statute itself. First, there is no minimum threshold for diminution in 
value in order to have a cause of action under the Act. This could create 
significant protection for abortion clinic owners that could make them 
more likely to win in Arizona state court as opposed to federal court 
(assuming that TRAP laws are ruled to be “land use laws” under the 
definition in the Act129). One possible hurdle clinic owners may face is 
that the Act creates an exception for, among other things, regulations 
that affect public health and safety.130 The Act states that its just com-
pensation provision will “not apply to land use laws that . . . [l]imit or 
prohibit a use or division of real property for the protection of the pub-
lic’s health and safety, including rules and regulations relating to fire 
and building codes, health and sanitation, transportation or traffic con-
trol, solid or hazardous waste, and pollution control.”131 State legisla-
tures would certainly argue that the purpose behind abortion clinic reg-
ulations is the health of women, as was argued in Whole Woman’s 
 
 125 See, e.g., Aspen 528, L.L.C. v. City of Flagstaff, No. 1 CA-CV 11-0512, 2012 WL 6601389 
(Ariz. Ct. App. Dec. 18, 2012); Turner v. City of Flagstaff, 226 Ariz. 341 (Ct. App. 2011); McDowell 
Residential Props., L.L.C. v. City of Avondale, No. 1 CA-CV 09-0301, 2010 WL 2602047 (Ariz. Ct. 
App. June 29, 2010). 
 126 See Sedona Grand, L.L.C. v. City of Sedona, 229 Ariz. 37, 42 (Ct. App. 2012). 
 127 See Bethany R. Berger, The Illusion of Fiscal Illusion in Regulatory Takings, 66 AM. U. L. 
REV. 1, 35 (2016) (“laws . . . in Florida and Arizona also chill land use regulations”); Sparks, supra 
note 124, at 213 (“these laws interfere with the ability of governments to regulate land use for the 
public good”). 
 128 Alex Potapov, Making Regulatory Takings Reform Work: The Lessons of Oregon’s Measure 
37, 39 ENVTL. L. REP. NEWS & ANALYSIS 10516, 10523 (2009). 
 129 See ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 12-1136(3) (defining “land use law” as “any statute, rule, ordinance, 
resolution or law . . . that regulates the use or division of land or any interest in land”). 
 130 See id. § 12-1134(B)(1). 
 131 Id. 
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Health. Abortion clinic owners have some possible arguments against 
this exception, however. 
One such argument is that the provision’s list of examples included 
in the public health and safety exception (e.g., “fire and building codes, 
health and sanitation,”132 etc.) may indicate that the drafters of the Act 
did not intend TRAP laws to be included in its purview. “Health and 
sanitation” is the listed example most plausibly relevant to abortion 
clinic regulations, but the grouping of “health” with “sanitation” could 
suggest that TRAP laws were not what the state legislature envisioned 
when it drafted the law, as opposed to making sure the property itself 
did not negatively impact public health. Additionally, it is the state that 
“has the burden of demonstrating that the land use law is exempt pur-
suant to [the public health and safety exception].”133 The Court of Ap-
peals of Arizona applied this rule in Sedona Grand, L.L.C. v. City of 
Sedona,134 indicating that the burden of proof requirement could do 
some work in future litigation. The facts in Whole Woman’s Health 
showed that Texas’s arguments that H.B. 2 improved women’s health 
were weak. The Court even pointed out that “when directly asked at 
oral argument whether Texas knew of a single instance in which the 
new requirement would have helped even one woman obtain better 
treatment, Texas admitted that there was no evidence in the record of 
such a case.”135 Although the public health exception could pose a prob-
lem for abortion clinic owners, it does not seem insurmountable, and 
such state laws generally are almost certainly more amenable to clinic 
owners than the federal counterpart. 
The only state court case that analyzed a claim under Arizona’s 
Private Property Rights Protection Act on the merits is Sedona Grand. 
In that case, the City of Sedona had a zoning regulation in place that 
prohibited short-term rentals of residential property. The plaintiff, Se-
dona Grand, notified the City that it was using what it called “Option 
Agreements,” where it would give prospective buyers the chance to “in-
spect” the property for a set period of time.136 The City responded by 
telling Sedona Grand that its use of Option Agreements violated the 
short-term rental prohibition, and a year later the City reinvigorated 
the ban by passing an ordinance making it unlawful to rent “residential 
property for less than 30 consecutive days to a ‘transient.’”137 Sedona 
 
 132 Id. 
 133 Id. § 12-1134(C). 
 134 229 Ariz. 37 (Ct. App. 2012). 
 135 Whole Woman’s Health v. Hellerstedt, 136 S. Ct. 2292, 2311–12 (2016). 
 136 Sedona Grand, 229 Ariz. at 39. 
 137 Id. 
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Grand then sued the City pursuant to the Private Property Rights Pro-
tection Act. 
Most relevant here, the City’s main defense was that its zoning reg-
ulation was for the “protection of the public’s health and safety.”138 The 
trial court had granted the City’s motion for summary judgment on this 
question because the ordinance itself had stated that public health and 
safety was the purpose; the appeals court reversed because “the Act 
specifically provides that the body enacting the law bears the burden of 
demonstrating that an exemption applies.”139 The court held that the 
City “must establish by a preponderance of the evidence that the law 
was enacted for the principal purpose of protecting the public’s health 
and safety before the exemption can apply.”140 In cases where the regu-
lation is itself evidence of a public health and safety purpose (such as 
regulating garbage accumulation or floodplains), the government does 
not have to provide further evidentiary showing. In cases such as Se-
dona Grand, however, “the nexus between prohibition of short-term oc-
cupancy and public health is not self-evident, and the governing body 
must do more than incant the language of a statutory exception to 
demonstrate that it is grounded in actual fact”; that is, “the City must 
provide evidence beyond mere ‘legislative assertion’ to carry [its] bur-
den” under the Act.141 If this is required of TRAP laws as well, then 
providing such outside evidence will likely prove difficult for the gov-
ernment (as it did in Whole Woman’s Health). 
C. Limitations of Using Takings Law 
The result of a successful takings claim for abortion clinic litigants 
is uncertain. Unlike a case where a plaintiff successfully argues that a 
law violates the Equal Protection Clause for example, finding a com-
pensable taking does not require that the offending regulation be re-
pealed. The government can repeal the regulation, amend it, commence 
eminent domain proceedings, or compensate the property owner.142 
Abortion clinic owners arguably would prefer to have the laws repealed 
than to be compensated, since future abortion clinics built after the reg-
ulation would have to comply with the burdensome law. This presents 
an issue as to whether a successful takings claim will result in the re-
peal of the regulation or only “just compensation” for property owners. 
 
 138 Id. 
 139 Id. at 42. 
 140 Id. 
 141 Id. at 43 (emphasis added). 
 142 See DANA & MERRILL, supra note 71, at 183. 
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In the past, other instances of compensable takings resulted in the gov-
ernment not enforcing the laws rather than compensating property 
owners.143 Even if the government did opt to pay the property owner as 
opposed to stop enforcing the regulation, such compensation may make 
the regulation too expensive to continue to enforce. Additionally, it may 
simply be bad optics for a state to pay abortion clinic owners when, pre-
sumably, a segment of its population wanted to enact the TRAP laws in 
the first place. 
Another practical issue with using takings law to combat TRAP 
laws is that there are appreciable, on-the-ground judicial hurdles in us-
ing any innovative framework at the trial level.144 Abortion litigation 
tends to be fast-paced because legislatures rapidly adopt anti-abortion 
restrictions, which often go into effect quickly. Therefore, plaintiffs who 
fight such laws often bring Motions for a Temporary Restraining Order 
before a preliminary injunction hearing. At these stages, courts are of-
ten reluctant to grant the requested temporary relief if the plaintiff’s 
side presents a complex, novel argument.145 The typical circumstances 
of such litigation are plaintiffs trying to keep new laws from going into 
effect or to stop them as soon as possible. But in order to be able to 
present a takings claim in the most effective manner, plaintiff abortion 
clinic owners will likely have to make the takings argument with regard 
to a regulation that has already been in effect and caused a diminution 
in value. 
Another practical reality to using takings law is that it may suffer 
from similar pitfalls present in traditional methods of combating TRAP 
laws. First, some of the relevant takings factors may end up requiring 
similar inquiries that happen in traditional Fourteenth Amendment de-
cisions. For example, if one of the questions is whether the government 
is preventing a harm or nuisance through its regulation, then the data-
driven debate about whether TRAP laws are actually protecting 
women’s health is inescapable. Second, takings claims are often very 
fact-intensive, so perhaps with different and more innovative TRAP 
laws, the generalities this Comment presents will not be applicable to 
a wide range of clinics. However, the most relevant fact in a takings 
inquiry will be the economic damage the property owner suffered. In 
cases where a TRAP law caused a clinic to close or to lose substantial 
 
 143 See, e.g., 26 U.S.C. § 9706 (invalidated by E. Enters. v. Apfel, 524 U.S. 498 (1998)). 
 144 See Smith, supra note 5, at 404–05 (“Because anti-abortion statutes are most likely to pass 
in the most conservative states, litigation is likely to take place in the most conservative courts in 
front of the most conservative judges and appellate courts. Understandably, litigators are reticent 
to raise new claims . . . in hostile federal courts.”). 
 145 Id. 
28 SILBERSTEIN PROOF G.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 12/13/17  12:33 PM 
737] TAKING ON TRAP LAWS 765 
 
money on renovations, the facts may be different for each clinic, but the 
takings strategy may still be sound. 
While some courts have struck down anti-abortion property regu-
lation through more conventional Fourteenth Amendment means,146 it 
is always useful to have another weapon in the arsenal against anti-
abortion regulation, especially because conservative judges and legisla-
tures may be more amenable to a takings argument than to other con-
stitutional claims. It is also worth noting that, despite the result in 
Whole Woman’s Health, the case itself was a five-four decision, with two 
of the justices in the majority over eighty years old. It is entirely likely 
that in coming years, the Court could overrule or limit the scope of 
Whole Woman’s Health. 
V. CONCLUSION 
The argument in this Comment is not intended to replace issues 
and cases that arise under Roe v. Wade147 and Casey. It is simply an-
other means by which abortion clinic owners and their employees, who 
are targeted in particular and separate ways from patients seeking 
abortion, can fight back against hostile legislation. Privacy and other 
substantive due process arguments under the Fourteenth Amendment 
will still have a role to play as state legislatures continue to enact laws 
that restrict abortion access through means other than regulating clinic 
owners, their facilities, and doctors who perform abortions. 
Takings law, however, adds a more concrete way to fight TRAP 
laws by capitalizing on clinics’ status as businesses and workplaces, 
ones that must support their patients and employees. The abortion 
clinic’s existence as a workplace, and its segregation from other types 
of workplaces, is what makes the takings argument especially feasible 
by couching the arguments in terms of property ownership and business 
operations. Abortion clinic owners face an unusually hostile and treach-
erous landscape. Because the debate over abortion rights can be so po-
litically polarizing, people likely do not think of abortion clinic owners 
as employers and businesspeople trying to make a living. Viewing an 
abortion clinic as another type of workplace may not only destigmatize 
and normalize abortion, but it may also functionally help clinics to re-
sist TRAP laws. 
The current political climate will likely engender further attempts 
to restrict abortion access. Although Whole Woman’s Health invalidated 
Texas’s TRAP laws, many states still have their own TRAP laws on the 
 
 146 See, e.g., Deerfield Med. Ctr. v. City of Deerfield Beach, 661 F.2d 328 (5th Cir. 1981). 
 147 410 U.S. 113 (1973). 
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books, and each must be challenged and litigated separately. By using 
takings law as a strategy, especially in conservative states that have 
enacted expansive property rights regimes, clinic owners and advocates 
can invalidate and perhaps prevent these laws in the future, allowing 
clinics to operate as more stable and effective workplaces that provide 
a much-needed service to their patients. 
